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Abstract. Tumor development is an evolutionary process in which a heterogeneous
population of cells with differential growth capabilities compete for resources in order to
gain a proliferative advantage. What are the minimal ingredients needed to recreate
some of the emergent features of such a developing complex ecosystem? What is a
tumor doing before we can detect it? We outline a mathematical model, driven by a
stochastic Moran process, in which cancer cells and healthy cells compete for dominance
in the population. Each are assigned payoffs according to a Prisoner’s Dilemma
evolutionary game where the healthy cells are the cooperators and the cancer cells
are the defectors. With point mutational dynamics, heredity, and a fitness landscape
controlling birth and death rates, natural selection acts on the cell population and
simulated ‘cancer-like’ features emerge, such as Gompertzian tumor growth driven
by heterogeneity, the log-kill law which (linearly) relates therapeutic dose density to
the (log) probability of cancer cell survival, and the Norton-Simon hypothesis which
(linearly) relates tumor regression rates to tumor growth rates. We highlight the utility,
clarity, and power that such models provide, despite (and because of) their simplicity
and built-in assumptions.
Keywords: cancer model; evolutionary game theory; Moran process; gompertzian tumor
growth; tumor heterogeneity; birth-death process
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1. Introduction
Cancer is an evolutionary process taking place within a genetically and functionally
heterogeneous population of cells that traffic from one anatomical site to another via
hematogenous and lymphatic routes [1, 7, 12, 53, 60]. The population of cells associated
with the primary and metastatic tumors evolve, adapt, proliferate, and disseminate
in an environment in which a fitness landscape controls survival and replication [31].
Tumorigenesis occurs as the result of inherited and acquired genetic, epigenetic and
other abnormalities accumulated over a long period of time in otherwise normal cells
[28, 49]. Before we can typically detect the presence of a tumor, the cells are already
competing for resources in a Darwinian struggle for existence in tissues that progressively
age and evolve. It is well established that the regenerative capacity of individual cells
within a tumor, and their ability to traffic multi-directionally from the primary tumor
to metastatic tumors all represent significant challenges associated with the efficacy
of different cancer treatments and our resulting ability to control systemic spread of
many soft-tissue cancers [36, 59]. Details of the metastatic and evolutionary process
are poorly understood, particularly in the subclinical stages when tumors are actively
developing but not yet clinically visible [52]. It could be argued that in order to truly
understand cancer progression at the level in which quantitative predictions become
feasible, it is necessary to understand how genetically and epigenetically heterogeneous
populations of cells compete and evolve within the tumor environment well before
the tumor is clinically detectable. Additionally, a better understanding of how these
populations develop resistance to specific therapies [16, 22] might help in developing
optimal strategies to attack the tumor and slow disease progression.
Evolutionary game theory is perhaps the best quantitative framework for modeling
evolution and natural selection. It is a dynamic version of classical game theory in which
a game between two (or more) competitors is played repeatedly, giving each participant
the ability to adjust their strategy based on the outcome of the previous string of
games. While this may seem like a minor variant of classical (static) game theory, as
developed by the mathematicians von Neumann and Morgenstern in the 1940’s [57],
it is not. Developed mostly by the mathematical biologists John Maynard Smith and
George Price in the 1970s [29, 30] and Martin Nowak and Karl Sigmund [44, 47] more
recently, this dynamic generalization of classical game theory has proven to be one of
the main quantitative tools available to evolutionary biologists (with a mathematical
bent) whose goal is to understand natural selection in evolving populations. In this
biological context, a strategy is not necessarily a deliberate course of action, but an
inheritable trait [50]. Instead of identifying Nash equilibria, as in the static setting
[34, 35], one looks for evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) and fixation probabilities
[19, 44] of a subpopulation. This subpopulation might be traced to a specific cell with
enhanced replicative capacity, for example, that has undergone a sequence of mutations
and is in the process of clonally expanding [48]. A relevant question in that case is
what is the probability of fixation of that subpopulation? More explicitly, how does one
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subpopulation invade another in a developing colony of cells?
One game in particular, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, has played a central role
in cancer modeling (as well as other contexts such as political science and economics)
[2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 45, 46, 47, 54, 55, 56, 58]. It was originally
developed by Flood, Dresher and Tucker in the 1950s as an example of a game which
shows how rational players might not cooperate, even if it seems to be in their best
interest to do so. The evolutionary version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game has thus
become a paradigm for the evolution of cooperation among a group of selfish individuals
and thus plays a key role in understanding and modeling the evolution of altruistic
behavior [2, 3]. Perhaps the best introductory discussion of these ideas is found in
Dawkins’ celebrated book, The Selfish Gene [8]. The framework of evolutionary game
theory allows the modeler to track the relative frequencies of competing subpopulations
with different traits within a bigger population by defining mutual payoffs among pairs
within the group. One can then define a fitness landscape over which the subpopulations
evolve. The fitness of different phenotypes is frequency dependent and is associated with
reproductive prowess, while the ‘players’ in the evolutionary game compete selfishly for
the largest share of descendants [19, 58]. Our goal in this article is provide a brief
introduction to how the Prisoner’s Dilemma game can be used to model the interaction
of competing subpopulations of cells, say healthy, and cancerous, in a developing tumor
and beyond.
2. The prisoner’s dilemma evolutionary game
An evolutionary game between two players is defined by a 2 x 2 payoff matrix which
assigns a reward to each player (monetary reward, vacation time, reduced time in jail,
etc.) on a given interaction. Let us call the two players A and B. In the case of a
prisoner’s dilemma game between cell types in an evolving population of cells, let there
be two subpopulations of cell types which we will call ‘healthy’, and ‘cancerous’. We can
think of the healthy cells as the subpopulation that is cooperating, and the cancer cells as
formerly cooperating cells that have defected via a sequence of somatic driver mutations.
Imagine a sequence of ‘games’ played between two cells (A and B) selected at random
from the population, but chosen in proportion to their prevalence in the population
pool. Think of a cancer-free organ or tissue as one in which a population of healthy
cells are all cooperating, and the normal organ functions are able to proceed, with
birth and death rates that statistically balance, so an equilibrium healthy population is
maintained (on average). Now imagine a mutated cell introduced into the population
with enhanced proliferative capability as encoded by its genome as represented as a
binary sequence of 0’s and 1’s carrying forward its genetic information (which is passed
on to daughter cells). A schematic diagram associated with this process is shown in
Figure 1. We can think of this cancer cell as a formerly cooperating cell that has
defected and begins to compete against the surrounding population of healthy cells for
resources and reproductive prowess. From that point forward, one can imagine tumor
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development to be a competition between two distinct competing subpopulations of
cells, healthy (cooperators) and cancerous (defectors). We are interested in the growth
rates of a ‘tumor’ made up of a collection of cancer cells within the entire population,
or equivalently, we are interested in tracking the proportion of cancer cells, i(t), vs. the
proportion of healthy cells, N− i(t), in a population of N cells comprising the simulated
tissue region.
To quantify how the interactions proceed, and how birth/death rates are ultimately
assigned, we introduce the 2 x 2 prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix:
A =
(
a b
c d
)
=
(
3 0
5 1
)
(1)
The essence of the prisoner’s dilemma game is the two players compete against
each other, and each has to decide what best strategy to adopt in order to maximize
their payoff. This 2 x 2 matrix assigns the payoff (e.g. reward) to each player on each
interaction. My options, as a strategy or, equivalently, as a cell type, are listed along
the rows, with row 1 associated with my possible choice to cooperate, or equivalently
my cell type being healthy, and row 2 associated with my possible choice to defect, or
equivalently my cell type being cancerous. Your options are listed down the columns,
with column 1 associated with your choice to cooperate (or you being a healthy cell),
and column 2 associated with your choice to defect (or you being a cancer cell). The
analysis of a rational player in a prisoner’s dilemma game runs as follows. I do not
know what strategy you will choose, but suppose you choose to cooperate (column 1).
In that case, I am better off defecting (row 2) since I receive a payoff of 5 instead of 3
(if I also cooperate). Suppose instead you choose to defect (column 2). In that case, I
am also better off defecting (row 2) since I receive a payoff of 1 instead of 0 (if I were
to have cooperated). Therefore, no matter what you choose, I am better off (from a
pure payoff point of view) if I defect. What makes this game such a useful paradigm
for strategic interactions ranging from economics, political science, biology, and even
psychology [2, 29, 58] is the following additional observation. You will analyze the game
in exactly the same way I did (just switch the roles of me and you in the previous
rational analysis), so you will also decide to defect no matter what I do. The upshot
if we both defect is that we will each receive a payoff of 1, instead of each receiving a
payoff of 3 if we had both chosen to cooperate. The defect-defect combination is a Nash
equilibrium [34, 35], and yet it is sub-optimal for both players and for the system as a
whole. Rational thought rules out the cooperate-cooperate combination which would be
better for each player (3 points each) and for both players combined (6 points). In fact,
the Nash equilibrium strategy of defect-defect is the worst possible system wide choice,
yielding a total payoff of 2 points, compared to the cooperate-defect or defect-cooperate
combination, which yields a total payoff of 5 points, or the best system-wide strategy
of cooperate-cooperate yielding a total payoff of 6 points.
The game becomes even more interesting if it is played repeatedly [58],
stochastically [55], and with spatial structure [27] with each player allowed to decide
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what strategy to use on each interaction so as to accumulate a higher payoff than the
competition over a sequence of N games. In order to analyze this kind of an evolving
set-up, a fitness function must be introduced based on the payoff matrix A. Let us
now switch our terminology so that the relevance to tumor cell kinetics becomes clear.
When modeling cell competition, one has to be careful about the meaning of the term
‘choosing a strategy’. Cells do not choose a strategy, but they do behave in different ways
depending on whether they are normal healthy cells cooperating as a cohesive group,
with birth and death rates that statistically balance, or whether they are cancer cells
with an overactive cell division mechanism (as triggered by the presence of oncogenes)
and an underactive ‘break’ mechanism (as triggered by the absence of tumor suppressor
genes) [60]. In our context, it is not the strategies that evolve, as cells cannot change
type based on strategy (only based on mutations), but the prevalence of each cell type in
the population is evolving, with the winner identified as the sub-type that first saturates
in the population.
3. A tumor growth model
Consider a population of N cells driven by a stochastic birth-death process as depicted
in Figure 1, with red cells depicting cancer cells (higher fitness) and blue cells depicting
healthy cells (lower fitness, but cooperative). We model the cell population as a
stochastic Moran process [61] of N cells, ‘i’ of which are cancerous, ‘N − i’ of which are
healthy. If each cell had equal fitness, the birth-death rates would all be equal and a
statistical balance would ensue. At each step, a cell is chosen (randomly but based on
the prevalence in the population pool) and eliminated (death), while another is chosen
to divide (birth). If all cells had equal fitness, the birth/death rates of the cancer cells
would be i/N , while those of the healthy cells would be (N− i)/N . With no mechanism
for introducing a cancer cells in the population, the birth/death rates of the healthy
cells would be 1, and no tumor would form.
Now, introduce one cancer cell into the population of healthy cells, as shown in
Figure 1. At each step, there would be a certain probability of this cell dividing (Pi,i+1),
being eliminated (Pi,i−1), or simply not being chosen for either division or death (Pi,i).
Based on this random process, it might be possible for the cancer cells to saturate the
population, as shown by one simulation in Figure 2 depicting N = 1000 cells, with
initially i = 1 cancer cell, and N − i = 999 healthy cells. However, the growth curve
would not show any distinct shape (Figure 2 (black)), and might well become extinct
after any number of cell divisions, as opposed to reaching saturation. But we emphasize
that without mutational dynamics, heritability, and natural selection operating on the
cell population, the shape of the growth curve would look random, and we know this is
not how tumors tend to grow [25, 26]. By contrast, Figure 2 (red) shows a Gompertzian
growth curve starting with exponential growth of the cancer cell subpopulation, followed
by linear growth, ending with saturation. The growth rate is not constant throughout
the full history of tumor development, but after an initial period of exponential growth,
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(a)
(b)
Figure 1: Schematic of the Moran Process — (a) During each time step, a single cell
is chosen for reproduction, where an exact replica is produced. With probability m
(0 ≤ m ≤ 1), a mutation may occur. (b) The number of cancer cells, i, is defined on the
state space i = 0, 1, . . . , N where N is the total number of cells. The cancer population
can change at most by one each time step, so a transition exists only between state i
and i1, i, and i+ 1.
the rate decelerates until the region saturates with cancer cells. The basic ingredients
necessary to sustain Gompertzian growth seem to be: an underlying stochastic engine of
developing cells, mutational dynamics, heritability, and a fitness landscape that governs
birth and death rates giving rise to some sort of natural selection.
3.1. Mutations and heritability
Each of the N cells in our simulated population carries with it a discrete packet of
information that represents some form of molecular differences among the cells. In our
model, we code this information in the form of a 4-digit binary string from 0000 up to
1111, giving rise to a population made up of 16 distinct cell types. At each discrete
step in the birth-death process, one of the digits in the binary string is able to undergo
a point mutation [13, 28], where a digit spontaneously flips from 0 to 1, or 1 to 0, with
probability pm. The mutation process is shown in Figure 1, while a mutation diagram
is shown in Figure 3 in the form of a directed graph. This figure shows the possible
mutational transitions that can occur in each cell, from step to step in a simulation. A
typical simulation begins with a population of N healthy cells, all with identical binary
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Figure 2: Emergence of Gompertzian growth via selection — Random drift (black)
plotted for a single simulation of 103 cells for 4 · 104 generations shows no particular
shape. A single simulation of the Moran process (red) with selection (w = 0.5) and
mutations (m = 0.1) gives rise to the characteristic S-shaped curve associated with
Gompertzian growth.
strings 0000. The edges on the directed graph represent possible mutations that could
occur on a given step. The first 11 binary string values (0-10) represent healthy cells in
our model that are at different stages in their evolutionary progression towards becoming
a cancer cell (the exact details of this genotype to phenotype map do not matter much).
Mutations strictly within this subpopulation are called passenger mutations as the cells
all have the same fitness characteristics. The first driver mutation occurs when a binary
string reaches value 11-15. The first cell that transitions from the healthy state to the
cancerous state is the renegade cell in the population that then has the potential to
clonally expand and take over the population. How does this process occur?
3.2. The fitness landscape
At the heart of how the Prisoner’s Dilemma evolutionary game dictates birth and
death rates which in turn control tumor growth, is the definition of cell fitness. Let
us start by laying out the various probabilities of pairs of cells interacting and clearly
defining payoffs when there are i cancer cells, and N − i healthy cells in the population.
The probability that a healthy cell interacts with another healthy cell is given by
(N − i− 1)/(N − 1), whereas the probability that a healthy cell interacts with a cancer
cell is i/(N − 1). The probability that a cancer cell interacts with a healthy cell is
(N − i)/(N − 1), whereas the probability that a cancer cell interacts with another
cancer cell is (i− 1)/(N − 1).
In a fixed population of N cells, with i cancer cells, the number of healthy cells is
given by N − i. The average payoff of a single cell (piH , piC), is dependent on the payoff
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Figure 3: Markov Point Mutation Diagram — Diagram shows 16 genetic cell types
based on 4-digit binary string and the effect of a point mutation on each cell type.
Blue indicates healthy cell type (0000 — 1010), red indicates cancerous cell type (1011
— 1111). Black arrows indicate passenger mutations (healthy to healthy or cancer to
cancer), red arrows indicate driver mutations (healthy to cancer).
matrix value weighted by the relative frequency of types in the current population:
piHi =
a(N − i− 1) + bi
N − 1 (2)
piCi =
c(N − i) + d(i− 1)
N − 1 (3)
Here, a = 3, b = 0, c = 5, d = 1 are the entries in the Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff
matrix (1). For the Prisoner’s dilemma game, the average payoff of a single cancer
cell is always greater than the average payoff for a healthy cell (Figure 4c). With the
invasion of the first cancer cell, the higher payoff gives a higher probability of survival
when in competition with a single healthy cell.
Selection acts on the entire population of cells as it depends not on the payoff, but
on the effective fitness of the subtype population. The effective fitness of each cell type
(fH , fC) is given by the relative contribution of the payoff of that cell type, weighted
by the selection pressure:
fHi = 1− w + wpiHi (4)
and the fitness of the cancer cells as:
fCi = 1− w + wpiCi (5)
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The probability of birthing a new cancer cell depends on the relative frequency (random
drift) weighted by the effective fitness, and the death rate is proportional to the relative
frequency. The transition probabilities can be written:
Pi,i+1 =
ifCi
ifCi + (N − i)fHi
N − i
N
(6)
Pi,i−1 =
(N − i)fHi
ifCi + (N − i)fHi
i
N
(7)
Pi,i = 1− Pi,i+1 − Pi,i−1; P0,0 = 1; PN,N = 1. (8)
In the event of the first driver mutation, the first cancer cell is birthed. At the
beginning of the simulation, the effective fitness of the healthy population is much
greater than the fitness of the cancer population (Figure 4b). This is because although
the single cancer has a higher payoff than any of the healthy cells, the number of healthy
cells far outnumber the single cancer cells. That single cancer cell initiates a regime of
explosive high growth and the fitness of the cancer population steadily increases. Cancer
cells are continually competing with healthy cells and receiving a higher payoff in this
regime (compare the payoff entries of a cancer cell receiving c = 5 vs a healthy cell
receiving b = 0). At later times, growth slows because cancer cells are competing
in a population consisting mostly of other cancer cells. The payoff for a cancer cell
is dramatically lower when interacting with a cancer cell (observe the payoff entry of
both cancer cells receiving d = 1 when interacting). As the cancer population grows,
the payoff attainable decreases and growth slows. In addition, the average fitness of
the total population steadily declines because each interaction derives less total payoff,
from c+ b = 5 to d+ d = 1.
This complex process of competition among cell types and survival of
subpopulations, where defection is selected over cooperation, produces a Gompertzian
growth curve shown in Figure 5, and compared with a compilation based on a wide range
of data first shown in [25, 26]. It is now well established that tumor cell populations (and
other competing populations, such as bacteria and viral populations) generally follow
this growth pattern, although the literature is complicated by the fact that different
parts of the growth curve have vastly different growth rates [25, 26], and it is nearly
impossible to follow the growth of a population of cancer cells in vivo from the first
cancer cell through to an entire tumor made up of O(109− 1012) cells. Growth rates are
typically measured for a short clinical time period [25, 26], and then extrapolated back
to the first renegade cell, and forward to the fully developed tumor population.
3.3. Heterogeneity drives growth
Insights into the process by which growth rates vary and conspire to produce a
Gompertzian shape can be achieved by positing that growth is related to molecular and
cellular heterogeneity of the developing population [5, 24, 53]. Indeed, an outcome of
the model is that molecular heterogeneity (i.e. the dynamical distribution of the 4-digit
The prisoner’s dilemma as a cancer model 10
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 4: Tumor fitness drives tumor growth — (a) The average of 25 stochastic
simulations (N = 1000 cells, w = 0.5, m = 0.1) is plotted for 20,000 cell divisions
to show the cancer cell population (defectors) saturating. The pink lines delineate the
regions of tumor growth (defined by the maximum and minimum points of the second-
derivative of i(t)). (b) Fitness of the healthy population, cancer population, and total
population plotted for the range cancer cell proportion. (c) Average payoff of a single
healthy cell, cancer cell, and all cells plotted for the range cancer cell proportion.
binary string 0000—1111 making up the population of cells) drives growth. Consider
The prisoner’s dilemma as a cancer model 11
Figure 5: Moran Process fit to Gompertzian Growth Data — The mean and deviation
of 25 stochastic simulations (N = 103 cells, w = 0.7, m = 0.3) is overlaid on data from
a “normalized” Gompertzian [25, 26]. Values for m and w were chosen by implementing
a least-squares fit to the data over a range of m (0 ≤ m ≤ 1), and w (0 ≤ w ≤ 1). Pink
lines delineate regions of growth (defined by the maximum and minimum points of the
second-derivative of i(t)).
entropy [6, 39] of the cell population as a measure of heterogeneity:
E(t) = −
N∑
i=1
pi log2 pi (9)
(here, log is defined as base 2). The probability pi measures the proportion of cells of
type i, with i = 1, . . . , 16 representing the distribution of binary strings ranging from
0000 to 1111. We typically course-grain this distribution further so that cells having
strings ranging from 0000 up to 1010 are called ‘healthy’, while those ranging from 1011
to 1111 are ‘cancerous’. Then growth is determined by:
dnE
dt
= αE(t) (10)
It follows from (10) that the cancer cell proportion nE(t) can be written in terms
of entropy as:
nE(t) = α
∫ t
0
E(t)dt (11)
This relationship between growth of the cancer cell population and entropy is pinned
down and detailed in [61]. We consider it to be one of the key emergent features of our
simple model.
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A typical example of the emergence of genetic heterogeneity in our model system
is shown in the form of a phylogenetic tree in Figure 6. This particular tree is obtained
via a simulation of only 30 healthy phenotypic cells (0000), which during the course of a
simulation expand out (radially in time) to form a much more heterogeneous population
of cells at the end of the simulation. In our model, the genetic time-history of each cell
is tracked and the population can be statistically analyzed after the simulation finishes.
Figure 6: Phylogenetic Tree — Sample dendritic phylogenetic tree tracking point
mutations as time extends radially, depicting the emergence of molecular heterogeneity.
The tree shows a simulation of 30 cells (all with genetic string 0000 at the beginning of
the simulation) with strong selection (w = 1, m = 0.2). Pathways are color coded to
indicate genetic cell type.
4. Simulated drug dosing strategies and therapeutic response
Figure 7 shows the clear advantage of early stage therapy in our model system. We
compare the effect of therapy given at an early stage, mid-stage, and late stages of
the Gompertzian growth of the tumor. The black Gompertzian curve is the freely
growing cancer cell population. The blue curve shows the cancer cell population
diminishing to zero in time ∆t1 of continual therapy. The red curves shows the same
therapy administered at a later stage in the growth phase (three stochastic simulations),
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diminishing to zero in time ∆t2 > ∆t1. The yellow curves show the therapy (five
stochastic simulations) administered even later, diminishing in time ∆t3 > ∆t2 > ∆t1.
In one of the simulations, the growing cancer cell population overcomes the killing effect
of the therapy. The purple curves shown in the figure all are late stage therapies which
do not kill the full population of cancer cells. In these cases, the growth of the cancer
cell population outstrips the ability of the simulated therapy to kill them off. Clearly,
the earlier in the growth phase the therapy is administered, the less time is required to
kill off the full population of cancer cells. But since the cancer cell population grows at
very different rates throughout the full Gompertzian history of the developing tumor,
this balance of kill cycles based on dose density and accelerated growth due to fitness
advantage needs to be quantitatively determined.
Figure 7: Effects of early stage, mid-stage, and late-stage therapies — An average of
5 stochastic simulations (N = 103 cells, w = 0.5, m = 0.1) with no therapy is plotted
(black). The stochastic response to therapy is shown for 4 different time points in tumor
progression. Therapy is designed to “kill off” cancer cells with potency equal to their
proportion. The first therapy (blue, beginning at 7 · 103 cell divisions) has the shortest
time to total elimination of cancer cells. The second (red at 8.5 · 103 cell) has a longer
time to total elimination. The kill effect is diminished further for the third and fourth
therapy (yellow, 104 and purple, 1.15 ·104 cell divisions) and some stochastic simulations
are not able to eliminate all cancer cells but only delay saturation.
An established empirical law which relates drug dose density to its effectiveness
in killing off cancer cells is known as the ‘log-kill’ law [51]. The log kill law states
that a given dose of chemotherapy kills the same fraction of tumor cells (as opposed
to the same number of tumor cells), regardless of the size of the tumor at the time
the therapy is administered [51], a consequence of exponential growth with a constant
growth rate. This effect is best illustrated on a dose-response curve, plotting the dose
density, D, with respect to the probability of tumor cell survival, PS. The dose density
is simply the product of the drug concentration, c, and the time over which the therapy
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is administered, t:
D = c · t (12)
Thus, the log-kill law states the following:
log(PS) = −βD (13)
As an example, if there are 1000 cancer cells in a population, and the first therapy
dose kills off 90% of them, then after the first round of therapy there will be 100 cancer
cells remaining. If a second round of therapy is administered, exactly as the first round,
starting soon enough so that no new cancer cells have formed, then this next round
will also kill off 90% of the cells, leaving 10 cells, and so on for each future round of
therapy. In a sense, since the first round killed 900 cells, while the second identical
round killed only 90 cells, the population gets increasingly more difficult to kill off using
the same treatment on each cycle. The log-kill law, a fundamentally static law (doesn’t
say anything about the relationship of the fraction of cells killed vs. the growth rate
of the tumor), is verified in our model system, as shown in Figure 8a. On the x-axis,
we increase the dose density D, and we plot the number of surviving cancer cells. The
slope of this straight line (verifying the log-kill law) can be thought of as the rate of
regression of the tumor, β.
(a) (b)
Figure 8: Growth-dependent tumor regression — (a) Average of 25 stochastic
simulations (N = 103 cells, w = 0.5, m = 0.1) where therapy is administered with
varied dose densities (0 ≤ D ≤ 1500, t = 100). The rate of tumor regression, β, the
slope of the red curve fit, is constant for a short period of simulated time where the
tumor growth rate is approximately constant. This is the log-kill law. (b) The process
to find the rate of tumor regression, β, is repeated for a range of instantaneous tumor
growth rates (1 · 10−4 ≤ γ ≤ 6 · 10−4). The Norton-Simon hypothesis predicts that β is
proportional to γ, indicated by a linear fit (red).
So how is the rate of regression, β, related to the growth rate of the tumor, γ?
This is relevant, since we know from the shape of the Gompertzian curve, the growth
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rate is highest (exponential) at the beginning stage of tumor development and lowest
at the late saturation stage. The Norton-Simon hypothesis [41, 42, 43] states that the
rate of regression is proportional to the instantaneous growth rate for an untreated
tumor of that size at the time therapy is first administered. Faster growing tumors
(early stage) should show higher rates of regression than more slowly growing tumors
(late stage). This hypothesis is also verified in our model system, and shown clearly
in Figure 8b. The reality of this growth-dependent tumor regression rate effect (where
early stage faster growing tumors are more vulnerable to therapy than later stage more
slowly growing tumors) combined with the fact that the first round of therapy is more
effective than future rounds of identical therapies, dramatically reinforces the need to
administer drug treatment early in tumor progression when growth rates are high and
there are fewer cancer cells to kill off. As drug concentration, c, is kept constant, the
effect of treatment is reduced at later times in tumor development (Figure 7) until the
same drug concentration is simply unable to overcome the tumor growth rate.
5. Markov dissemination and progression patterns
So how do these molecular and cellular growth details manifest themselves on the larger
scales associated with metastatic progression patterns in patients? Despite the fact
that disease progression patterns can vary from patient to patient, if a sufficiently large
cohort of patients with similar characteristics is tracked over the course of the disease,
statistical patterns emerge and can be exploited to build dynamical models of large scale
progression. This lies at the heart of the models described in [37, 38, 39] for lung cancer
progression, and [39, 40] for breast cancer progression.
As an example of the kinds of whole-body scale models that can be built, consider
first the tree-ring diagram shown in Figure 9a. The diagram encapsulates the entire
progression history of a cohort of 289 primary breast cancer patients tracked at the
Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center for a 20 year period. All of the patients
entered the cohort with a primary breast tumor, but no metastatic tumors. The inner
ring, shown in pink, represents this cohort when they entered the study. As time
progresses, the rings grow out, surrounding the inner breast ring. The first ring out
shows the metastatic tumor distribution associated with first recurrence. The sector
sizes represent the percentage of patients in this group. Likewise, the second ring out
represents the distribution of tumors on second recurrence, and so forth for the further
rings out. Hence, subsequent rings outward represent the tumor distributions as time
progresses, with each patient history depicted on a ray going out from the center of
the ring diagram. We caution that despite our usage of the term ‘tree-ring’ diagrams
for these representations, the thickness of the rings are all equal, hence do not reflect
the time between subsequent recurrences (timescales of progression are documented and
modeled in [40]). The power of the diagrams is that in one quick glance, one gains an
appreciation for the statistical complexity of the disease [39, 40]. From them, one can
also calculate the probability of the disease ‘transitioning’ from one site to another as the
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disease progresses (called transition probabilities). These can then be used to create a
single Markov transition matrix for each cancer type [39], which quantitatively encodes
much of the information associated with the disease. Figure 9b shows the Markov
transition graph from the last metastatic site to the deceased state for the cohort from
Figure 9a. The sites are ordered clockwise from the most probably last metastatic site,
to the least probable.
Figure 9: Spatiotemporal patterns of breast cancer metastasis — (a) Tree-ring diagram
depicting all the paths in the clinical cohort over a 20-year period. (b) Markov
chain network depicting transition probabilities from patients last metastatic tumor to
deceased. (c) Reduced Markov chain diagram for sub-population of Her2+ patients. Red
sites are spreader sites, blue sites are sponge sites. Note that bone is the main spreader.
(d) Reduced Markov chain diagram for sub-population of ER-/Her2- patients. Red sites
are spreader sites, blue sites are sponge sites. Note that bone is the main spreader, but
Lung/pleura switches from being a spreader for Her2+ patients, to being a sponge for
ER-/Her2- patient.
Figures 9c and 9d show reduced Markov diagrams [39, 40] for two specific
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important sub-groups of breast cancer patients, Her2+ patients, and ER-/Her2-
patients. Generally speaking, Her2+ patients have the poorest prognosis. The red
sites in these reduced diagrams (bone, lung/pleura, chest wall, LN (mam)) in Figure 9c,
and bone, LN (mam), chest wall in Figure 9d are the spreaders associated with these
groups. The blue sites (liver, LN (dist), brain for Fig. 9c; LN (dist), lung/pleura, liver,
brain for Fig. 9d) are the sponges [37, 38, 39]. It is interesting to note that lung/pleura
switches from a spreader in the Her2+ sub-group to a sponge in the ER-/Her2- sub-
group, suggesting a possible biological difference of the site in the different groups that
correlates with different survival probabilities.
6. Mathematical modeling and tumor analytics
It is important to keep in mind that no mathematical model captures all aspects of
reality, so choices must be made which involve prioritizing the features that are most
essential in capturing the essence of a complex process and which are not. Most
experts now agree that the evolutionary processes in a tumor played out among
subpopulations of competing cells are key to understanding aspects of growth and
resistance to chemotherapy, which will ultimately lead the way toward a quantitative
understanding of tumor growth and cancer progression [31, 59, 60]. The paradigm of the
cancer cell subpopulation and the healthy cell subpopulation competing as the defectors
and cooperators in a Prisoner’s Dilemma evolutionary game has been useful in obtaining
a quantitative handle on many of these processes and frames the problem in an intuitive
yet predictive way.
Nonetheless, the mathematical ‘taste’ of the modeler plays a role in what techniques
are selected and ultimately where the spotlight shines. This fact makes clinicians
uncomfortable and can lead to deep suspicion of the mathematical modeling enterprise as
a whole. Aren’t the outcomes and predictions of mathematical models a straightforward
consequence of the model assumptions? Once those choices are made, isn’t the cake
already baked? So why should we be surprised if you tell us it tastes good? Why not
simply use tried and true statistical tools like regression methods to curve-fit the data
directly, with no built in assumptions, and be satisfied with uncovering correlations
and trends? Clinicians (and experimentalists, in general) feel that they are dealing
directly with reality, so why mess around with ‘toy’ systems based on possibly ‘ad hoc’
or incorrect assumptions that create artificial realities that may or may not be relevant?
To a theoretician, calling their assumptions ad hoc, as opposed to natural, is as insulting
as calling a clinician sloppy and uncaring (try this for yourself at the next conference
you go to! But please use the term ‘somewhat ad hoc’ to lessen the blow.) And if you
want to deliver an even harsher insult, you could comment that the model seems like
an exercise in curve fitting.
But the usefulness of mathematical models built on simplified assumptions is well
established in the history of the physical sciences, as detailed beautifully in Peter Dear’s
book, The Intelligibility of Nature: How Science Makes Sense of the World [9]. Bohr’s
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simple model of the structure of the atom was crucial in moving the community forward
towards a deeper understanding of cause and effect, and ultimately pushing others to
develop more realistic atomic models. The same could be said for many other important,
but ultimately discarded models of reality (e.g. the notion of aether used as a vehicle to
understand the mysterious notion of action-at-a-distance [9]) now relegated to footnotes
in the history of the physical sciences.
Lessons from this history highlight the importance of using the principle of Occam’s
razor (law of parsimony) as a heuristic guide in developing models: (1) keep things
simple, but not too simple; (2) see what can be explained by using a given set of
assumptions, and try to identify what is either wrong or cannot be explained; (3) add
complexity to the model, but do this carefully. Since ultimately, the model will always
be wrong (with respect to some well chosen and specific new question being posed about
a system), it is important that it be useful as a vehicle of intelligibility [9] associated
with the set of questions surrounding the phenomena it was built to explain. Answers
to some new questions will be found using the model as a temporary crutch, and new
questions will emerge in the process that had not yet been asked, as their relevance
had never previously been realized. A new quantitative language will emerge in which
aspects of the model will be associated with the underlying reality it is attempting to
describe, predictions will be easier to frame and test, and shortcomings will be exposed.
In his famous article [62], Eugene Wigner writes compellingly that ‘the miracle of the
appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics
is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve. We should be grateful for it
and hope that it will remain valid in future research and that it will extend, for better or
for worse, to our pleasure, even though perhaps also to our bafflement, to wide branches
of learning.’
In general, the more complex the model (as measured, for example, by the number
of independent parameters associated with it), the less useful it will be, and the less likely
it is to be adopted by the community at large. After all, if the model is as complex as
the phenomena it was built to understand, why not stick with reality? Effective models
can be thought of as low-dimensional approximations of reality, surrogates that help
us bootstrap our way forward. They arise as the outcome of a complex balancing act
between simplicity of the ingredients, and complexity of the reality the model is meant
to describe. They generally do not arise in a vacuum, but are built in the context of
informed and sustained discussions among people with different expertise. In the context
of medical oncology, this means physical scientists developing ongoing interactions with
clinical oncologists, radiologists, pathologists, molecular and cell biologists and other
relevant medical specialists.
Appropriate data is a necessary ingredient in developing and testing any successful
model, and treasure troves of medical data sit unexamined in patient files and
government databases across the country waiting to be put to good use. There is
no doubt that they are telling an interesting and important story that we have yet to
fully understand. It is not currently possible for the computer to simulate all of the
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complex, relevant, and systemic ingredients at play to faithfully recreate all aspects of
cancer progression and treatment response in patients. It is hard to imagine that a deep
and actionable understanding can ever be obtained without the combined use of data,
models, and computer simulations to help guide us and highlight some of the underlying
causal mechanisms of this complex and deadly disease.
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